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  for	  present	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  over	  delayed	  rewards,	  a	  phenomenon	  known	  as	  temporal	  discounting	  (TD).	  TD,	  of	  perennial	  interest	  because	  of	  its	  violation	  of	  rational	  economic	  theory,	  is	  associated	  with	  poor	  outcomes	  such	  as	  drug	  addiction	  and	  perhaps	  even	  global	  warming.	  Recent	  research	  has	  shown	  that	  episodic	  future	  thinking	  can	  reduce	  temporal	  discounting,	  possibly	  by	  modulating	  subjective	  valuation	  processes	  through	  imagery-­‐based	  operations	  supported	  by	  the	  medial	  temporal	  lobe	  and	  connecting	  structures.	  Interestingly,	  a	  growing	  body	  of	  additional	  research	  suggests	  that	  episodic	  memory	  and	  episodic	  future	  thought	  share	  similar	  cognitive	  processes	  and	  neural	  mechanisms.	  	  Given	  these	  findings,	  an	  immediate	  question	  is	  whether	  episodic	  memory	  can	  also	  reduce	  temporal	  discounting.	  	  To	  investigate	  this	  question,	  we	  created	  a	  behavioral	  paradigm	  whereby	  participants	  performed	  intertemporal	  choice	  trials,	  but	  each	  trial	  was	  primed	  by	  either	  a	  brief	  period	  of	  episodic	  past	  thought,	  episodic	  future	  thought,	  or	  a	  non-­‐episodic	  imagery	  control	  condition.	  In	  line	  with	  previous	  findings,	  participants	  discounted	  future	  rewards	  compared	  to	  present	  rewards	  and	  showed	  wide	  inter-­‐individual	  variability	  in	  their	  discounting	  rates.	  However,	  when	  
iv	  
comparing	  discounting	  rates	  between	  the	  three	  conditions,	  results	  revealed	  that	  episodic	  memory	  reduced	  TD	  more	  than	  episodic	  future	  thought	  and	  the	  imagery	  control	  condition.	  	  In	  contrast,	  no	  differences	  in	  TD	  were	  observed	  between	  the	  episodic	  future	  thought	  condition	  and	  the	  control	  condition.	  	  Given	  that	  the	  episodic	  past	  thought	  condition	  was	  associated	  with	  higher	  self-­‐reported	  imagery	  than	  the	  episodic	  future	  thought	  condition,	  these	  findings	  suggest	  that	  basic	  episodic	  imagery	  processes	  might	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  modulating	  intertemporal	  decision-­‐making.
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Introduction	  	   A	  typical	  decision-­‐making	  scenario	  involves	  choosing	  between	  options	  that	  vary	  in	  the	  delay	  at	  which	  they	  will	  be	  delivered.	  This	  process,	  referred	  to	  as	  intertemporal	  choice,	  requires	  weighing	  tempting	  short-­‐term	  rewards	  against	  long-­‐term	  goals.	  For	  example,	  if	  you	  are	  at	  a	  store	  and	  see	  a	  shiny	  new	  gadget,	  you	  must	  weight	  the	  reward	  of	  buying	  it	  against	  long-­‐term	  goals	  such	  as	  investing	  that	  money	  in	  order	  to	  happily	  retire	  later	  in	  life.	  	  Unfortunately,	  humans	  show	  a	  preference	  for	  immediate	  rewards	  over	  future	  ones,	  a	  phenomenon	  known	  as	  temporal	  discounting.	  Temporal	  discounting	  is	  of	  perennial	  interest	  because	  of	  its	  violation	  of	  rational	  economic	  theory,	  which	  can	  lead	  to	  poor	  outcomes	  such	  as	  credit	  card	  debt	  or	  even	  global	  warming.	  Furthermore,	  deficiencies	  in	  intertemporal	  choice	  have	  been	  linked	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  disorders	  such	  as	  substance	  abuse	  and	  attention	  deficit	  hyperactivity	  disorder	  (ADHD).	  Fortunately,	  the	  last	  decade	  has	  seen	  a	  leap	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  neural	  decision-­‐making	  mechanisms	  which	  economists	  hope	  can	  improve	  behavioral	  prediction	  and	  psychologists	  hope	  can	  improve	  decision-­‐making	  in	  those	  with	  mental	  disorders	  as	  well	  as	  healthy	  individuals.	  	  In	  particular,	  recent	  research	  has	  seen	  a	  surge	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  contribution	  of	  episodic	  future	  thought,	  along	  with	  corresponding	  activity	  in	  the	  medial	  temporal	  lobe,	  when	  choosing	  delayed	  rewards.	  In	  the	  present	  study,	  we	  seek	  to	  further	  specify	  the	  role	  of	  episodic	  future	  thought	  in	  reducing	  temporal	  discounting	  by	  comparing	  it	  with	  a	  very	  similar	  process:	  episodic	  memory	  or	  episodic	  past	  thought.	  In	  the	  present	  manuscript,	  I	  will	  first	  review	  behavioral	  findings	  on	  human	  temporal	  discounting	  and	  its	  underlying	  neural	  mechanisms	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  contribution	  of	  episodic	  future	  thought.	  Next,	  the	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manuscript	  reviews	  recent	  findings	  on	  episodic	  future	  thought	  and	  compares	  it	  with	  episodic	  past	  thought.	  Finally,	  I	  will	  describe	  the	  present	  experiment	  and	  it’s	  results,	  ending	  with	  a	  discussion	  on	  its	  significance	  on	  the	  existing	  literature.	  	  
Behavioral	  findings	  
The	  primary	  behavioral	  finding	  in	  intertemporal	  choice	  research	  is	  temporal	  discounting.	  Temporal	  discounting	  is	  the	  phenomenon	  that	  humans,	  as	  well	  as	  animals,	  behave	  as	  if	  rewards	  that	  are	  available	  in	  the	  future	  are	  worth	  less	  than	  awards	  available	  immediately.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  subjective	  value	  of	  rewards	  available	  in	  the	  future	  is	  discounted	  as	  time	  until	  delivery	  increases.	  This	  behavior	  is	  very	  robust	  and	  often	  leads	  to	  people	  choosing	  smaller	  rewards	  available	  immediately	  over	  larger	  rewards	  available	  in	  the	  future.	  For	  example,	  if	  faced	  with	  100	  dollars	  now	  and	  120	  dollars	  in	  one	  month,	  a	  discounter	  might	  pick	  the	  smaller	  presently	  available	  reward.	  In	  this	  case,	  it	  would	  be	  said	  that	  the	  subjective	  value	  of	  the	  future	  reward,	  discounted	  by	  time,	  was	  lower	  than	  the	  subjective	  value	  of	  the	  immediately	  available	  reward.	  	  Modeling	  the	  rate	  and	  function	  with	  which	  humans	  discount	  future	  rewards	  with	  time	  has	  been	  a	  primary	  focus	  of	  research	  on	  intertemporal	  choice.	  In	  particular,	  by	  giving	  subjects	  a	  range	  of	  combinations	  of	  reward	  values	  and	  future	  reward	  delays,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  fit	  a	  function	  and	  discount	  parameter,	  k,	  to	  their	  preferences.	  It	  is	  of	  particular	  interest	  to	  economists	  to	  compare	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  that	  function	  deviates	  from	  the	  normative	  model	  of	  temporal	  discounting.	  According	  to	  a	  discounted	  utility	  model,	  future	  rewards	  should	  be	  discounted	  at	  an	  exponential	  rate	  with	  time	  (Samuelson,	  1937)⁠.	  Exponential	  discounting	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  assumption	  that	  future	  rewards	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  occur	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and	  thus	  have	  reduced	  utility;	  moreover,	  exponential	  discounting	  results	  in	  consistent	  preferences	  over	  time,	  as	  the	  rate	  of	  discounting	  is	  constant	  per	  period.	  	  A	  vast	  literature	  on	  human	  temporal	  discounting	  suggests,	  however,	  that	  people	  discount	  rewards	  hyperbolically	  (Frederick,	  Loewenstein,	  &	  O’donoghue,	  2002) ⁠.	  Hyperbolic	  discount	  functions	  decay	  at	  a	  more	  rapid	  rate	  in	  the	  short	  run	  than	  in	  the	  long	  run,	  such	  that	  hyperbolic	  discounters	  are	  more	  impatient	  when	  choosing	  among	  short-­‐term	  tradeoffs	  than	  long-­‐run	  tradeoffs	  (Berns,	  Laibson,	  &	  Loewenstein,	  2007)⁠.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  difference	  in	  subjective	  value	  between	  a	  reward	  available	  now	  and	  a	  reward	  available	  in	  one	  week	  is	  greater	  than	  the	  difference	  between	  a	  reward	  available	  in	  one	  week	  and	  one	  available	  in	  two.	  Hyperbolic	  discounting	  has	  been	  blamed	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  unwanted	  behaviors,	  including	  reversal	  of	  preferences	  –	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  making	  a	  decision	  only	  to	  change	  it	  in	  the	  future	  (Ainslie	  &	  Herrnstein,	  1981) ⁠.	  For	  example,	  one	  might	  choose	  to	  stop	  unnecessary	  spending	  this	  year	  only	  to	  reverse	  that	  decision	  and	  splurge	  on	  an	  attractive	  but	  unnecessary	  gadget	  at	  the	  store.	  Another	  widely	  studied	  aspect	  of	  intertemporal	  choice	  is	  the	  wide	  variability	  observed	  between	  people.	  The	  study	  of	  individual	  differences	  in	  temporal	  discounting	  is	  facilitated	  by	  the	  robust	  model	  based	  analyses	  previously	  mentioned;	  such	  precise	  models	  allow	  for	  comparisons	  between	  minute	  changes	  between	  individuals	  (Peters	  &	  Büchel,	  2011)⁠.	  Two	  important	  types	  of	  trait	  variability	  exist	  in	  intertemporal	  choice.	  Firstly,	  even	  among	  healthy	  participants,	  rates	  of	  discounting	  vary	  widely	  and	  have	  been	  found	  to	  differ	  among	  people	  with	  different	  personalities	  (Hirsh,	  Morisano,	  &	  Peterson,	  2008)⁠.	  These	  inter-­‐individual	  differences	  have	  been	  found	  to	  quite	  robust	  and	  stable	  over	  time.	  Second,	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specific	  population	  groups	  have	  been	  found	  to	  show	  markedly	  steeper	  discounting	  functions.	  In	  particular,	  people	  with	  ADHD	  (Barkley,	  Edwards,	  Laneri,	  Fletcher,	  &	  Metevia,	  2001)⁠,	  substance-­‐abuse	  disorders	  (Coffey,	  Gudleski,	  Saladin,	  &	  Brady,	  2003) ⁠,	  and	  compulsive	  gamblers	  (Petry	  &	  Casarella,	  1999)⁠	  discount	  rates	  faster	  than	  healthy	  adults,	  showing	  less	  patience	  for	  delayed	  rewards.	  Steeper	  discounting	  has	  also	  been	  associated	  with	  lower	  IQs	  and	  related	  outcome	  measures	  such	  as	  scholastic	  performance	  (Shamosh	  et	  al.,	  2008) ⁠.	  This	  wide	  variation	  in	  discounting	  behavior	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  real-­‐world	  outcomes	  has	  led	  researchers	  to	  create	  unified	  frameworks	  of	  intertemporal	  choice	  which	  try	  to	  account	  for	  the	  range	  of	  behaviors	  discussed	  above	  with	  a	  few	  underlying	  variables	  (Berns,	  Laibson,	  &	  Loewenstein,	  2007)⁠.	  For	  example,	  one	  framework	  proposes	  that	  three	  separable	  factors,	  anticipation,	  self-­‐control	  and	  representations,	  account	  for	  the	  differences	  observed.	  However,	  others	  have	  attested	  that	  other	  factors	  (such	  as	  future	  orientation),	  better	  account	  for	  inter-­‐individual	  variability	  (at	  least	  in	  development;	  see	  Steinberg	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  
Neural	  Mechanisms	  In	  cognitive	  neuroscience,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  great	  interest	  in	  using	  functional	  neuroimaging	  to	  understand	  the	  neural	  underpinnings	  of	  intertemporal	  choice.	  This	  attempt	  has	  shown	  promise	  in	  helping	  create	  a	  unified	  framework	  for	  understanding	  the	  basic	  mechanisms	  underlying	  intertemporal	  choice,	  thus	  illustrating	  the	  various	  points	  where	  this	  mechanism	  can	  break	  in	  people	  with	  disorders	  or	  vary	  among	  healthy	  individuals.	  However,	  just	  as	  there	  has	  been	  difficulty	  in	  arriving	  at	  a	  unified	  framework	  behaviorally,	  debate	  still	  rages	  regarding	  the	  function	  of	  the	  neural	  mechanisms	  implicated.	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Two	  processing	  stages	  have	  been	  proposed:	  valuation,	  which	  is	  the	  neural	  computation	  and	  representation	  of	  the	  subjective	  values	  of	  available	  decisions	  options,	  and	  choice,	  which	  are	  the	  processes	  supporting	  selection	  of	  one	  of	  the	  options.	  (Peters	  and	  Buchel,	  2011).	  Within	  these	  processes,	  the	  valuation	  network	  supports	  the	  representation	  of	  value,	  while	  cognitive	  control	  regions	  support	  conflict	  resolution,	  strategy	  adaptation	  and	  self-­‐control.	  Moreover,	  areas	  such	  as	  the	  medial	  temporal	  lobe	  support	  episodic	  future	  thought	  which	  is	  thought	  to	  increase	  the	  representational	  value	  of	  future	  rewards.	  	  
Valuation	  	   	  Research	  in	  cognitive	  neuroscience	  has	  supported	  the	  idea	  that	  mesolimbic	  dopaminergic	  regions,	  in	  particular	  the	  ventral	  striatum	  (VS)	  and	  the	  ventromedial	  prefrontal	  cortex	  (vmPFC)	  play	  a	  major	  role	  in	  calculating	  and	  representing	  the	  subjective	  incentive	  value	  of	  available	  options	  across	  a	  variety	  of	  reward	  types.	  Neurons	  in	  these	  areas	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  also	  activate	  for	  the	  consumption	  of	  primary	  rewards	  in	  monkeys	  and	  were	  initially	  thought	  to	  represent	  the	  value	  of	  immediately	  available	  rewards.	  Consistent	  with	  a	  domain-­‐general	  view,	  an	  influential	  study	  found	  that	  the	  VS,	  vmPFC	  as	  well	  as	  the	  posterior	  cingulate	  cortex	  (PCC),	  tracked	  the	  discounted	  subjective	  value	  of	  future	  rewards	  (Kable	  &	  Glimcher,	  2007).	  Subjective	  value	  is	  crucial;	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  the	  brain	  does	  not	  represent	  objective	  value	  of	  available	  options	  but	  takes	  into	  account	  individual	  preferences	  and	  contextual	  information	  to	  calculate	  the	  end	  value	  of	  an	  option	  to	  the	  organism.	  Thus,	  if	  one	  values	  an	  option	  less,	  such	  as	  a	  temporally	  discounted	  reward,	  activity	  in	  these	  regions	  will	  be	  less	  than	  an	  equivalent	  reward	  that	  is	  immediately	  available.	  Moreover,	  an	  individual	  with	  a	  steep	  discounting	  function	  (i.e.	  an	  “impulsive”	  individual)	  will	  show	  less	  activity	  in	  these	  regions	  for	  a	  delayed	  reward	  than	  an	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individual	  that	  discounts	  less	  steeply.	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  a	  domain-­‐general	  view	  of	  this	  valuation	  network,	  in	  which	  subjective	  value	  is	  represented	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  domains.	  	  For	  example,	  stimuli	  that	  are	  proximal	  to	  the	  self,	  and	  higher	  in	  subjective	  value,	  engage	  vmPFC	  to	  a	  greater	  extent	  than	  do	  distal	  stimuli	  (Tamir	  &	  Mitchell,	  in	  press).	  Thus,	  the	  value	  that	  is	  computed	  by	  the	  valuation	  network	  for	  a	  potential	  reward	  determines	  the	  likelihood	  that	  that	  reward	  will	  be	  chosen.	  
Cognitive	  Control	   	  	   In	  addition	  to	  systems	  representing	  incentive	  value	  of	  options,	  brain	  networks	  involved	  in	  resolving	  conflict	  and	  implementing	  strategies	  play	  a	  role	  in	  decision-­‐making.	  In	  particular,	  regions	  of	  the	  brain	  involved	  in	  cognitive	  control,	  such	  as	  dorsolateral	  prefrontal	  cortex	  (DLPFC)	  and	  the	  anterior	  cingulate	  cortex	  (ACC)	  help	  resolve	  conflict	  between	  two	  options	  that	  are	  close	  in	  subjective	  value.	  A	  choice	  between	  two	  options	  which	  are	  valued	  similarly	  by	  the	  valuation	  network	  require	  additional	  top-­‐down	  biasing	  in	  order	  to	  select	  a	  reward.	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  findings	  that	  activity	  in	  DLPFC	  and	  ACC	  increase	  when	  the	  subjective	  value	  of	  an	  immediate	  reward	  and	  a	  delayed	  reward	  are	  very	  close.	  ACC	  activity	  also	  reflects	  increases	  in	  conflict-­‐induced	  response	  times.	  In	  regards	  to	  the	  function	  of	  ACC	  signals,	  some	  propose	  that	  they	  serve	  to	  bias	  behavior	  towards	  less	  demanding	  and	  more	  efficient	  strategies	  (Peters	  and	  Buchel,	  2011).	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  a	  recent	  finding	  that	  valuation	  signals	  in	  ACC	  correlate	  with	  the	  degree	  of	  change	  in	  temporal	  discounting	  between	  two	  different	  experimental	  contents	  (Peters	  and	  Buchel,	  2010).	  	  	   In	  addition	  to	  conflict	  resolution,	  DLPFC	  seems	  to	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  biasing	  value	  signals	  in	  vmPFC	  to	  conform	  to	  higher-­‐level	  goals.	  In	  a	  recent	  study,	  dieters	  made	  real	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decisions	  about	  food	  consumption	  and	  rated	  food	  stimuli	  on	  their	  taste	  and	  health	  value.	  VmPFC	  tracked	  goal-­‐value	  in	  all	  subjects;	  however,	  only	  subjects	  that	  exhibited	  self-­‐control	  behaviorally	  (self-­‐controllers)	  incorporated	  both	  health	  and	  taste	  value	  into	  this	  value	  signal.	  Moreover,	  when	  self-­‐controllers	  exercised	  self-­‐control,	  DLPFC	  activity	  increased	  and	  modulated	  the	  value	  signal	  in	  vmPFC	  via	  ventrolateral	  PFC	  (Hare,	  Camerer,	  &	  Rangel,	  2009)⁠.	  Thus,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  ability	  to	  modulate	  subjective	  value	  in	  vmPFC	  to	  incorporate	  higher-­‐level	  goals	  depends	  on	  top-­‐down	  modulation	  from	  DLPFC.	  	  In	  regards	  to	  temporal	  discounting,	  this	  suggests	  that	  DLPFC	  should	  increase	  in	  activity	  when	  subjects	  successfully	  exercise	  self-­‐control	  and	  modulate	  their	  value	  signal	  in	  vmPFC	  in	  order	  to	  select	  the	  future	  reward.	  Indeed,	  many	  have	  found	  that	  choosing	  the	  later	  choice	  engages	  DLPFC	  (McClure	  et	  al.,	  2004) ⁠.	  Moreover,	  a	  recent	  study	  found	  that	  subjects	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  choose	  the	  immediate	  option	  in	  difficult	  trials	  when	  rTMS	  was	  used	  to	  disrupt	  processing	  in	  left	  lateral	  prefrontal	  cortex	  (LPFC)	  (Figner	  et	  al.,	  2010) ⁠.	  Importantly,	  this	  effect	  was	  greatest	  when	  the	  two	  options	  were	  close	  in	  subjective	  value,	  suggesting	  LPFC	  plays	  a	  greater	  role	  in	  biasing	  vmPFC	  value	  signals	  when	  decisions	  are	  difficult.	  Importantly,	  disrupting	  LPFC	  only	  affected	  decisions	  made	  but	  not	  valuation	  of	  the	  same	  rewards.	  These	  findings	  are	  consistent	  with	  a	  domain-­‐general	  computation	  of	  subjective	  value	  occurring	  in	  vmPFC,	  which	  can	  be	  modulated	  by	  DLPFC	  to	  raise	  the	  value	  of	  rewards	  that	  are	  difficult	  to	  choose	  (such	  as	  temporally	  distant	  offers).	  	  
Episodic	  Future	  Thought	  and	  Temporal	  Discounting	  Of	  recent	  research	  interest	  has	  been	  the	  role	  of	  thinking	  about	  the	  future,	  or	  episodic	  future	  thought,	  in	  human’s	  ability	  to	  delay	  gratification	  relative	  to	  other	  species.	  In	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particular,	  some	  have	  suggested	  that	  the	  ability	  to	  envision	  the	  future	  to	  determine	  the	  potential	  value	  of	  a	  future	  option	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  the	  ability	  to	  choose	  a	  larger	  delayed	  reward	  when	  a	  smaller	  immediate	  award	  is	  available.	  The	  specific	  role	  that	  episodic	  future	  thought	  plays	  in	  reducing	  temporal	  discounting,	  however,	  is	  not	  well	  known.	  	  Episodic	  future	  thought	  is	  the	  process	  of	  constructing	  a	  scene	  of	  the	  future	  using	  information	  from	  previous	  experiences,	  episodic	  memory,	  in	  order	  to	  make	  predictions	  about	  possibilities	  in	  ones	  future.	  Such	  “prospective”	  processes	  allow	  people	  to	  forecast	  and	  care	  about	  events	  that	  are	  not	  currently	  affecting	  them	  but	  may	  come	  into	  play	  later	  on.	  While	  the	  exact	  mechanisms	  and	  computations	  involved	  in	  this	  processes	  are	  still	  underspecified,	  specific	  brain	  regions	  seem	  to	  play	  a	  prominent	  role.	  These	  brain	  areas	  include	  the	  medial	  temporal	  lobe	  (MTL),	  which	  also	  plays	  a	  large	  role	  in	  episodic	  memory,	  the	  vmPFC	  and	  the	  PCC	  (Schacter	  &	  Addis,	  2009;	  Schacter,	  Addis,	  &	  Buckner,	  2007;	  2008)⁠.	  	  In	  particular,	  it	  is	  thought	  that	  the	  MTL	  and	  PCC	  allow	  construction	  of	  hypothetical	  events	  from	  episodic	  memories	  of	  previous	  events.	  This	  is	  supported	  by	  the	  finding	  that	  both	  of	  these	  areas	  also	  are	  active	  for	  memory	  retrieval	  tasks.	  In	  fact,	  one	  study	  directly	  compared	  elaboration	  of	  future	  and	  past	  episodes	  and	  found	  almost	  complete	  overlap	  in	  activation	  between	  these	  two	  regions	  (Addis,	  2007).	  In	  addition,	  another	  study	  found	  that	  when	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  imagine	  themselves	  in	  an	  unfamiliar	  setting,	  with	  no	  episodic	  memories	  from	  that	  context,	  the	  MTL	  and	  PCC	  exhibited	  relatively	  little	  activity	  (Szpunar,	  2009).	  Despite	  the	  overwhelming	  similarity	  in	  brain	  activity	  between	  these	  two	  processes,	  there	  does	  seem	  to	  be	  some	  areas	  that	  are	  specifically	  activated	  for	  future	  thought.	  In	  particular,	  the	  anterior	  hippocampus	  was	  more	  engaged	  for	  future	  thought,	  suggesting	  this	  area	  is	  involved	  in	  the	  reconstruction	  of	  episodes.	  Moreover,	  anterior	  areas	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of	  vmPFC	  have	  been	  found	  to	  activate	  for	  envisioning	  future	  emotional	  events.	  Interestingly,	  this	  area	  shows	  greater	  activity	  for	  far	  future	  events	  compared	  to	  near	  future	  events.	  This	  adds	  confusion	  about	  the	  role	  of	  vmPFC,	  given	  that	  far	  future	  events	  have	  lower	  subjective	  value	  and	  would	  be	  expected	  to	  show	  less	  activity	  in	  vmPFC	  valuation	  regions	  (D’Argembeau,	  Xue,	  Lu,	  Van	  der	  Linden,	  &	  Bechara,	  2008).	  	  Given	  that	  intertemporal	  choice	  necessitates	  that	  subjects	  consider	  a	  future	  option,	  it	  is	  logical	  to	  assume	  that	  episodic	  future	  thought	  might	  play	  a	  role	  in	  truly	  evaluating	  the	  future	  option.	  For	  example,	  the	  reduction	  in	  temporal	  discounting	  with	  age	  in	  adolescence	  has	  been	  associated	  with	  increased	  future	  orientation,	  not	  impulse	  control	  (Steinberg	  et	  al,	  2007).	  Furthermore,	  the	  link	  between	  episodic	  future	  thought	  and	  intertemporal	  choice	  is	  obviated	  by	  the	  consistent	  activation	  of	  the	  medial	  temporal	  lobe	  in	  intertemporal	  choice	  tasks.	  Additionally,	  damage	  to	  the	  hippocampus	  increases	  temporal	  discounting	  in	  rats	  (Cheung	  &	  Cardinal,	  2005).	  Given	  the	  clear	  theoretical	  and	  neural	  overlap	  between	  these	  two	  processes,	  there	  has	  a	  recent	  surge	  of	  interest	  in	  investigating	  their	  interaction.	  One	  recent	  study	  looked	  at	  the	  modulatory	  effect	  that	  MTL-­‐mediated	  future	  thought	  has	  on	  intertemporal	  choice	  (Peters	  &	  Büchel,	  2010)⁠.	  In	  this	  study,	  the	  investigators	  conducted	  a	  pre-­‐scan	  interview	  to	  determine	  future	  events	  that	  subjects	  had	  planned.	  The	  subjects	  then	  completed	  a	  modified	  temporal	  discounting	  task	  that	  presented	  cues	  referring	  to	  the	  future	  events	  subjects	  from	  the	  interview.	  For	  example,	  if	  a	  subject	  said	  they	  had	  an	  upcoming	  vacation	  in	  Paris	  in	  two	  months,	  a	  reminder	  cue	  (e.g.	  “vacation	  paris”)	  would	  be	  presented	  to	  them	  in	  a	  trial	  when	  they	  were	  deciding	  between	  an	  immediate	  reward	  and	  a	  reward	  in	  two	  months.	  Interestingly,	  neural	  valuation	  signals	  in	  the	  ACC	  and	  functional	  coupling	  of	  the	  ACC	  with	  the	  hippocampus	  and	  amygdala	  predicted	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the	  extent	  to	  which	  discounting	  was	  modulated	  by	  future	  thought.	  In	  addition,	  an	  imagery	  score	  was	  calculated	  for	  each	  subject	  from	  imagery	  intensity	  and	  frequency	  scores	  they	  gave	  to	  their	  future	  thought	  episodes.	  A	  robust	  regression	  found	  that	  subjects	  with	  higher	  imagery	  scores	  discounted	  less.	  	  The	  findings	  from	  this	  study	  suggest	  that	  MTL	  mediated	  future	  thought	  serve	  to	  increase	  the	  valuation	  signal	  which	  future	  rewards	  elicit	  via	  episodic	  imagery,	  in	  turn	  reducing	  temporal	  discounting.	  	  A	  more	  recent	  study	  asked	  subjects	  to	  imagine	  a	  specific	  event	  of	  spending	  money.	  Participants	  were	  given	  a	  delay	  period,	  a	  monetary	  amount	  and	  a	  specific	  contextual	  cue	  (e.g.,	  $35	  in	  180	  days	  at	  a	  pub)	  and	  asked	  to	  either	  imagine	  spending	  the	  money	  or	  merely	  estimate	  what	  the	  money	  could	  buy.	  Immediately	  afterwards,	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  make	  a	  binary	  choice	  between	  that	  future	  amount	  and	  a	  smaller	  reward	  available	  immediately.	  Imagining,	  but	  not	  estimating,	  reduced	  temporal	  discounting.	  Additionally,	  activity	  in	  medial	  rostral	  prefrontal	  cortex	  (mrPFC)	  predicted	  future-­‐oriented	  choices	  on	  a	  trial-­‐by-­‐trial	  basis.	  Increased	  mrPFC-­‐Hippocampus	  coupling	  resulted	  in	  a	  greater	  reduction	  in	  temporal	  discounting.	  The	  authors	  suggest	  that	  mrPFC	  uses	  information	  from	  the	  hippocampus	  to	  represent	  the	  undiscounted	  utility	  of	  envisioned	  events.	  Experiencing	  the	  delay	  reward	  through	  episodic	  future	  thought	  biases	  one	  toward	  farsighted	  decisions	  (Benoit,	  S.	  J.	  Gilbert,	  &	  Burgess,	  2011).	  The	  results	  from	  the	  previous	  two	  studies	  provide	  a	  host	  of	  exciting	  possibilities	  but	  also	  raise	  questions	  regarding	  the	  specific	  roles	  regions	  involved	  in	  both	  future	  thought	  and	  intertemporal	  choice	  are	  playing.	  In	  particular,	  the	  previous	  two	  studies	  found	  different	  areas	  that	  were	  postulated	  to	  represent	  the	  value	  obtained	  from	  the	  hippocampus	  (ACC	  and	  mrPFC).	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  if	  the	  process	  by	  which	  the	  future	  option	  is	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biased	  with	  future	  thought	  is	  by	  the	  specific	  increase	  of	  the	  appetitive	  value	  of	  the	  future	  option	  (as	  represented	  in	  vmPFC),	  or	  a	  more	  general	  effect	  of	  thinking	  about	  the	  future.	  Thinking	  about	  the	  future	  could	  increase	  the	  participant’s	  orientation	  to	  the	  future	  on	  that	  trial,	  and	  in	  turn	  increase	  their	  propensity	  to	  choose	  the	  delayed	  option.	  Less	  interesting	  but	  also	  problematic	  is	  that	  simply	  by	  engaging	  in	  imagery,	  the	  appetitive	  value	  of	  the	  present	  option	  could	  be	  reduced;	  since	  the	  “estimate”	  condition	  in	  the	  aforementioned	  study	  does	  not	  engage	  imagery,	  no	  proper	  condition	  has	  been	  included	  to	  control	  for	  that	  possibility.	  Finally,	  a	  difficult	  problem	  to	  avoid,	  demand	  characteristics,	  could	  be	  present	  in	  the	  previous	  two	  studies.	  In	  both	  studies,	  when	  episodic	  future	  thought	  was	  induced,	  it	  was	  on	  a	  specific	  choice	  that	  they	  were	  facing;	  it	  is	  possible	  demand	  characteristics	  could	  have	  played	  a	  role	  in	  the	  temporal	  discounting	  reduction	  given	  that	  the	  connection	  between	  episodic	  future	  thought	  and	  the	  decision-­‐making	  trial	  was	  not	  occluded.	  	  
Present	  Experiment	  Overview	   	  The	  present	  experiment	  will	  help	  elucidate	  the	  process	  that	  mediates	  how	  temporal	  discounting	  may	  be	  reduced	  by	  invoking	  episodes	  of	  future	  thought.	  In	  particular,	  three	  changes	  were	  made	  from	  the	  previous	  studies.	  First,	  in	  addition	  to	  having	  participants	  think	  about	  the	  future,	  we	  will	  also	  ask	  them	  to	  think	  about	  the	  past.	  Given	  the	  overwhelming	  overlap	  in	  the	  neural	  systems	  recruited	  by	  episodic	  future	  thought	  and	  episodic	  past	  thought	  (Addis,	  Wong,	  &	  Schacter,	  2007;	  Szpunar,	  Watson,	  &	  McDermott,	  2007)	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  a	  common	  processes	  to	  both	  future	  and	  past	  thought	  is	  driving	  the	  reduction	  in	  temporal	  discounting.	  In	  particular,	  some	  have	  suggested	  that	  the	  ability	  to	  escape	  from	  the	  present	  and	  be	  oriented	  to	  time	  in	  general,	  not	  just	  to	  future,	  might	  underlie	  the	  ability	  to	  make	  patient	  choices	  (Steinberg,	  2007).	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	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idea	  that	  thinking	  about	  the	  past	  informs	  decisions	  made	  in	  the	  present.	  Moreover,	  having	  a	  past	  thought	  control	  condition	  will	  provide	  a	  baseline	  for	  both	  behavioral	  and	  future	  neuroimaging	  analyses	  to	  isolate	  any	  unique	  contribution	  of	  future	  thought.	  	  The	  second	  change	  we	  introduce	  is	  to	  induce	  episodic	  thought	  via	  priming	  using	  a	  word-­‐cue	  paradigm	  rather	  than	  by	  specifically	  asking	  individuals	  to	  think	  about	  a	  specific	  episodic	  future	  event	  when	  making	  their	  decision.	  The	  motivation	  for	  this	  manipulation	  is	  twofold.	  First,	  by	  having	  participants	  thinking	  about	  specific	  episodes	  (either	  in	  the	  past	  or	  future)	  that	  is	  unrelated	  to	  the	  specific	  choices	  they	  will	  be	  making,	  we	  will	  be	  testing	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  reduction	  in	  temporal	  discounting	  shown	  in	  the	  aforementioned	  studies	  is	  due	  to	  a	  general	  increase	  in	  temporal	  orientation	  rather	  than	  an	  increase	  of	  the	  appetitive	  value	  of	  the	  particular	  future	  option.	  In	  particular,	  Benoit	  (2011)	  suggested	  that	  thinking	  about	  the	  future	  option	  allowed	  the	  undiscounted	  value	  representation	  to	  be	  transferred	  from	  memory	  to	  valuation	  systems.	  This	  resulted	  in	  greater	  subjective	  value	  for	  the	  future	  choice,	  increasing	  the	  likelihood	  that	  it	  would	  be	  chosen.	  However,	  if,	  as	  we	  test,	  unrelated	  episodic	  temporal	  thought	  reduces	  temporal	  discounting,	  it	  would	  suggest	  that	  the	  reduction	  of	  TD	  by	  episodic	  future	  thought	  is	  more	  general	  and	  the	  underlying	  process	  is	  driven	  by	  “temporal	  orientation”.	  Second,	  by	  making	  thinking	  about	  a	  future	  (or	  past)	  episode	  unrelated	  to	  the	  subsequent	  choice	  that	  the	  participant	  will	  make,	  it	  is	  less	  likely	  that	  the	  participant	  is	  likely	  to	  make	  the	  future	  choice	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  please	  the	  researcher	  or	  comply	  with	  what	  they	  believe	  is	  the	  task	  goal	  (i.e.	  demand	  characteristics).	  Thus,	  if	  an	  effect	  is	  found,	  it	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  from	  a	  true	  change	  in	  preferences	  that	  is	  mediated	  by	  episodic	  thought	  rather	  than	  by	  demand	  characteristics,	  as	  is	  possible	  in	  the	  prior	  study	  by	  Benoit	  et	  al.	  (2011).	  
	   13	  
A	  final	  change	  to	  the	  design	  that	  will	  be	  made	  is	  to	  include	  an	  “imagery”	  baseline.	  In	  particular,	  it	  is	  hypothesized	  that	  the	  reduction	  of	  temporal	  discounting	  by	  episodic	  future	  thought	  is	  driven	  by	  the	  use	  of	  mental	  imagery.	  However,	  no	  studies	  have	  compared	  episodic	  future	  thought	  to	  a	  condition,	  which	  includes	  mental	  imagery	  but	  does	  not	  include	  episodic	  thought.	  By	  using	  mental	  imagery	  as	  a	  baseline,	  we	  can	  confirm	  that	  the	  observed	  reduction	  in	  TD	  is	  not	  due	  to	  a	  general	  byproduct	  of	  mental	  imagery,	  but	  to	  the	  use	  of	  mental	  imagery	  by	  episodic	  future	  thought	  processes.	  In	  summary,	  the	  present	  study	  will	  further	  investigate	  state	  changes	  of	  TD	  by	  episodic	  future	  thought	  by	  1)	  adding	  an	  episodic	  past	  thought	  condition	  2)	  adding	  an	  imagery	  control	  condition	  and	  3)	  having	  episodic	  imagery	  be	  unrelated	  to	  the	  decision-­‐making	  trial.	  This	  will	  1)	  test	  the	  idea	  that	  TD	  is	  reduced	  by	  a	  more	  general	  “temporal	  orientation,”	  2)	  provide	  addition	  control	  to	  which	  we	  can	  compare	  the	  reduction	  of	  TD	  by	  episodic	  future	  thought	  and	  3)	  test	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  episodic	  past	  thought	  can	  also	  reduce	  TD.	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Methods	   	  
Participants	  In	  total,	  data	  from	  44	  subjects	  are	  included	  in	  the	  present	  study.	  Subjects	  provided	  informed	  written	  consent	  and	  the	  study	  was	  approved	  by	  the	  Institutional	  Review	  Board.	  10	  participants	  were	  excluded	  from	  the	  study	  because	  their	  discount	  functions	  were	  classified	  as	  nonsystematic.	  i.e.,	  they	  either	  did	  not	  discount	  by	  at	  least	  10%	  of	  the	  immediate	  reward	  even	  at	  the	  longest	  delay	  (indicating	  that	  no	  discounting	  occurred),	  at	  least	  one	  indifference	  point	  was	  greater	  than	  the	  preceding	  indifference	  point	  by	  a	  value	  of	  more	  than	  20%	  of	  the	  immediate	  reward	  indicating	  inconsistent	  preferences	  (Johnson	  &	  Bickel,	  2008).	  Prior	  studies	  have	  shown	  similar	  rates	  of	  exclusion	  (Kable	  &	  Glimcher,	  2007;	  Peters	  &	  Büchel,	  2010)	  
Imagination	  and	  Decision-­‐Making	  Task	  Thirty	  past,	  future	  and	  imagery	  control	  trials	  were	  presented	  for	  a	  total	  of	  90	  trials.	  Trials	  were	  pseudorandomized	  such	  that	  trials	  of	  the	  same	  type	  did	  not	  occur	  more	  than	  twice	  in	  a	  row.	  Each	  trial	  was	  14s	  in	  duration	  and	  consisted	  of	  an	  episodic	  construction	  and	  elaboration	  phase	  followed	  by	  an	  intertemporal	  choice	  phase.	  	  The	  episodic	  construction	  and	  elaboration	  phase	  consisted	  of	  a	  modified	  Crovitz	  cueing	  procedure	  (Crovitz	  &	  Schiffman,	  1974;	  Addis,	  Wong,	  &	  Schacter,	  2007)	  in	  which	  participants	  used	  a	  word	  cue	  to	  imagine	  one	  of	  three	  things:	  a)	  a	  past	  event,	  b)	  a	  plausible	  future	  event,	  or	  c)	  performed	  a	  control	  imagery	  condition.	  For	  the	  duration	  of	  this	  phase,	  a	  cue	  slide	  was	  presented	  which	  consisted	  of	  the	  task	  condition	  (past,	  future	  or	  imagery	  control)	  and	  a	  cue	  word.	  In	  the	  past	  condition,	  participants	  used	  the	  cue	  to	  think	  of	  a	  memory	  that	  had	  happened	  to	  them	  in	  the	  last	  two	  years,	  whereas	  in	  the	  future	  condition	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they	  used	  the	  cue	  to	  think	  of	  a	  plausible	  event	  that	  could	  happen	  to	  them	  in	  the	  next	  two	  years.	  The	  event	  did	  not	  have	  to	  be	  strictly	  related	  to	  the	  presented	  cue	  and	  participants	  were	  encouraged	  to	  use	  the	  cue	  to	  help	  them	  think	  of	  a	  specific	  event	  (for	  example,	  for	  the	  cue	  “ski”	  and	  the	  condition	  “past”,	  the	  participant	  need	  not	  be	  a	  skier;	  they	  could	  think	  of	  the	  last	  time	  they	  heard	  about	  somebody	  going	  skiing	  or	  it	  could	  remind	  them	  of	  a	  movie	  they	  saw	  in	  which	  someone	  skied).	  Participants	  were	  instructed	  to	  press	  a	  button	  when	  they	  “found”	  a	  specific	  event	  to	  imagine	  and	  to	  use	  the	  remaining	  time	  to	  elaborate	  on	  the	  episode.	  This	  was	  done	  to	  encourage	  participants	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  task	  and	  have	  a	  measure	  to	  compare	  the	  similarity	  between	  the	  conditions.	  They	  were	  encouraged	  to	  elaborate	  on	  the	  details	  of	  the	  episode	  including	  visual	  imagery	  for	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  time.	   In	  the	  imagery	  control	  condition,	  participants	  used	  the	  cue	  to	  generate	  in	  their	  minds	  two	  objects	  –	  one	  smaller	  and	  one	  larger	  	  -­‐	  than	  the	  cue	  object.	  They	  were	  instructed	  to	  press	  a	  button	  once	  they	  had	  generated	  the	  two	  objects	  and	  use	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  time	  to	  elaborate	  on	  the	  perceptual	  details	  of	  the	  objects	  they	  were	  imagining.	  This	  condition	  was	  designed	  to	  engage	  participants	  in	  visual	  imagery	  while	  eliminating	  the	  episodic	  and	  temporal	  aspects	  of	  the	  “past”	  and	  “future”	  conditions	  (Addis	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  In	  all	  conditions,	  the	  reaction	  time	  to	  generate	  the	  targets	  of	  imagery	  was	  recorded	  and	  the	  cues	  remained	  on	  the	  screen	  for	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  trial.	  	  During	  the	  intertemporal	  choice	  phase,	  participants	  performed	  a	  trial	  from	  a	  standard	  delay	  discounting	  procedure.	  In	  each	  trial,	  two	  choices	  were	  presented	  for	  four	  seconds	  –	  an	  immediately	  available	  reward	  of	  $10	  dollars	  and	  a	  reward	  available	  at	  a	  variable	  delay	  that	  was	  higher	  in	  value.	  Participants	  were	  then	  given	  two	  seconds	  to	  choose	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either	  the	  immediate	  or	  delayed	  reward.	  In	  total,	  there	  were	  30	  trials	  that	  were	  used	  for	  each	  of	  the	  3	  conditions.	  These	  trials	  consisted	  of	  five	  delays	  (5,	  10,	  21,	  42,	  and	  120	  days)	  and	  six	  reward	  amounts	  for	  the	  future	  option	  (ranging	  from	  $11-­‐27).	  The	  specific	  delays	  and	  reward	  values	  used	  were	  chosen	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  pilot	  work	  to	  determine	  ranges	  that	  would	  appropriately	  capture	  the	  discounting	  function	  of	  participants.	  Participants	  were	  informed	  that	  as	  (partial)	  payment	  for	  their	  participation	  one	  of	  their	  choices	  they	  selected	  would	  be	  randomly	  chosen	  and	  that	  they	  would	  receive	  the	  selected	  amount	  in	  the	  form	  of	  an	  Amazon.com	  gift	  certificate	  at	  the	  specified	  delay.	  For	  example,	  if	  the	  participant	  chose	  $20	  in	  42	  days	  instead	  of	  $10	  now,	  and	  that	  choice	  was	  randomly	  selected	  for	  their	  payment,	  that	  individuals	  would	  receive	  a	  gift	  certificate	  via	  email	  in	  42	  days	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  $20.	  A	  two	  second	  interstimulus	  interval	  separated	  the	  end	  of	  the	  intertemporal	  choice	  phase	  and	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  next	  trial.	  	  
Phenomenological	  Ratings	   	  Following	  the	  “imagination	  and	  decision-­‐making”	  task	  ,	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  rate	  phenomenological	  attributes	  of	  imagery	  from	  the	  first	  phase.	  All	  attributes	  were	  rated	  using	  a	  6	  point	  scale.	  Participants	  were	  shown	  each	  word	  cue	  and	  the	  condition	  in	  which	  it	  occurred	  and	  asked	  to	  rate	  imagery	  vividness	  (no	  image	  at	  all	  …	  perfectly	  clear	  and	  vivid),	  emotionality	  (detachment	  …	  highly	  emotional)	  and	  personal	  significance	  (insignificant	  …	  very	  personally	  significant)	  of	  the	  imagery.	  For	  cues	  occurring	  for	  the	  “past”	  and	  “future”	  conditions,	  they	  were	  also	  asked	  how	  far	  in	  the	  past/future	  the	  episode	  they	  imagined	  was	  using	  a	  5	  point	  scale.	  Finally	  at	  the	  end	  of	  experiment,	  participants	  were	  asked	  if	  they	  were	  aware	  that	  the	  intent	  of	  the	  experiment	  was	  to	  influence	  their	  intertemporal	  decisions	  using	  episodic	  imagery.	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Stimuli	  	   Cue	  words	  for	  the	  episodic	  construction	  and	  elaboration	  phase	  were	  selected	  from	  the	  MRC	  Psycholinguistics	  Database	  (http://www.psy.uwa.edu.au/mrcdatabase).	  	  Words	  were	  selected	  such	  that	  they	  were	  high	  on	  concreteness	  (mean	  =	  585	  out	  of	  700),	  imaginability	  (mean	  =	  595	  out	  of	  700),	  meaningfulness	  (mean	  =	  528	  out	  of	  700),	  and	  familiarity	  (mean	  =	  581	  out	  of	  700).	  The	  stimuli	  were	  split	  into	  three	  lists	  of	  30	  words	  and	  the	  lists	  were	  matched	  on	  all	  four	  ratings	  and	  number	  of	  letters.	  Usage	  of	  the	  separate	  lists	  in	  the	  three	  conditions	  was	  counterbalanced	  across	  subjects.	  	  
Data	  Analysis	   	  Individual’s	  choice	  behaviors	  was	  analyzed	  using	  R	  Project	  for	  Statistical	  Computing.	  	  Each	  subject’	  s	  indifference	  points	  were	  calculated	  at	  each	  delay	  and	  fit	  to	  individualized	  discounting	  curves	  for	  each	  condition	  separately.	  For	  each	  delay,	  subjects’	  choices	  were	  binarized	  as	  either	  choosing	  the	  delayed	  choice	  (1)	  or	  not	  (0).	  Then,	  a	  logistic	  function	  was	  fit	  on	  the	  choice	  values	  and	  the	  delayed	  reward	  values.	  Using	  the	  parameters	  from	  the	  fit,	  the	  later	  value	  at	  which	  participants	  were	  indifferent	  (or	  had	  a	  0.5	  chance	  probability	  of	  choosing	  either	  option)	  was	  determined.	  Due	  to	  the	  assumptions	  of	  logistic	  functions,	  certain	  values	  had	  to	  be	  assumed	  when	  the	  subject’s	  choices	  violated	  these	  assumptions.	  In	  particular,	  when	  subjects	  made	  only	  one	  type	  of	  response	  for	  a	  delay,	  the	  logistic	  function	  failed	  to	  fit	  and	  the	  indifference	  point	  was	  assumed	  to	  be	  just	  outside	  of	  the	  range	  of	  values	  presented	  (30.5	  in	  the	  case	  of	  all	  “now”	  responses	  and	  10.5	  in	  the	  case	  of	  all	  “later”	  responses).	  These	  values	  were	  the	  closest	  possible	  indifference	  points	  to	  half	  a	  dollar	  to	  the	  possible	  estimates	  that	  could	  be	  made	  using	  the	  delayed	  values	  shown.	  Discounted	  value	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(DV)	  was	  calculated	  for	  each	  delay	  using	  the	  indifference	  points	  (DV=$10/indifference	  point).	  	  Next,	  the	  following	  hyperbolic	  discounting	  function	  was	  fit	  to	  the	  DVs:	  DV=1(1+k*D),	  where	  D	  is	  the	  delay	  length	  in	  days	  and	  k	  is	  the	  unknown	  discounting	  parameter.	  Nonlinear	  least	  squares	  were	  used	  to	  obtain	  an	  estimate	  of	  the	  k	  parameter.	  The	  hyperbolic	  function	  used	  is	  a	  standard	  method	  for	  modeling	  temporal	  discounting	  functions.	  As	  the	  resulting	  distribution	  of	  k	  parameters	  failed	  the	  Shapiro-­‐Wilk	  test	  for	  normality	  (W	  =	  0.7037,	  p<.001),	  k	  values	  were	  log	  transformed	  in	  order	  to	  conform	  to	  assumptions	  of	  the	  GL.	  Prior	  studies	  have	  made	  similar	  transformations	  (Peters	  &	  Büchel,	  2010).	  In	  order	  to	  estimate	  the	  effects	  of	  imagery	  condition	  (past,	  future,	  size)	  on	  temporal	  discounting	  (k),	  we	  fit	  a	  linear	  mixed	  effects	  model	  using	  lme	  from	  the	  nlme	  package	  for	  R.	  In	  particular,	  we	  entered	  imagery	  control	  condition	  (past,	  future,	  or	  imagery	  control)	  as	  a	  predictor	  and	  log	  (k)	  as	  the	  response	  variable.	  We	  treated	  condition	  as	  a	  fixed	  effect	  and	  subject	  as	  a	  random	  effect.	  The	  resulting	  analysis	  is	  equivalent	  to	  a	  repeated	  measures	  ANOVA.	  We	  then	  used	  contrast	  codes	  to	  test	  for	  various	  combinations	  of	  group	  relationships	  adhoc	  (i.e.	  Future	  v	  Past,	  Past	  vs	  Future	  &	  Imagery	  Control).	  	  	   We	  also	  investigated	  the	  relationship	  of	  phenomonological	  ratings	  given	  to	  specific	  imagery	  episodes	  in	  order	  to	  compare	  the	  three	  conditions	  and	  determine	  which	  attributes	  best	  predicted	  intertemporal	  choice.	  To	  do	  this,	  we	  employed	  a	  linear	  mixed	  effects	  model	  with	  restricted	  maximum	  likelihood	  (REML)	  estimation	  using	  the	  lmer	  function	  from	  the	  lme4	  package	  for	  R.	  First,	  we	  investigated	  the	  relationship	  of	  emotionality,	  imagery	  intensity	  and	  self-­‐relevance	  to	  choice	  behavior	  by	  regressing	  the	  three	  predictors	  on	  later	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responses	  across	  the	  entire	  dataset.	  The	  three	  item	  predictors	  were	  modeled	  as	  fixed	  effects	  because	  they	  showed	  low	  standard	  errors	  when	  modeled	  as	  random	  effects.	  Subject	  number	  and	  cue	  word	  were	  included	  in	  the	  model	  as	  random	  effects.	  In	  order	  to	  include	  time	  ratings	  into	  the	  model,	  we	  excluded	  the	  imagery	  control	  (with	  no	  temporal	  ratings),	  and	  added	  time	  into	  the	  model,	  separately.	  
	  
Results	   	  
Decision-­‐making	  phase	   	  K	  values	  obtained	  from	  curve	  fitting	  to	  individual’s	  DVs	  ranged	  from	  0.0016	  to	  0.1148,	  suggesting	  there	  was	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  individual	  differences	  in	  temporal	  discounting	  in	  our	  sample.	  K	  values	  were	  highly	  correlated	  with	  average	  percentage	  of	  later	  responses	  in	  each	  condition	  (Pearson’s	  r	  =-­‐0.86,	  p<.001),	  suggesting	  that	  k	  values	  were	  representative	  of	  choice	  behavior.	  	  In	  order	  to	  investigate	  the	  effect	  of	  mental	  imagery	  on	  intertemporal	  choice,	  we	  regressed	  condition	  type	  on	  the	  k	  discounting	  parameters,	  revealing	  of	  an	  effect	  of	  condition	  (t32=2.8,p<.05;	  Table	  1).	  By	  comparing	  conditions,	  it	  was	  revealed	  that	  the	  effects	  were	  driven	  by	  the	  past	  condition,	  such	  that	  participants	  showed	  less	  temporal	  discounting	  on	  decision-­‐making	  trials	  following	  episodic	  past	  thought	  compared	  to	  the	  other	  two	  conditions	  (F=4.81,	  p<.05).	  These	  findings	  suggest	  that	  thinking	  about	  the	  past	  reduces	  temporal	  discounting.	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Condition	   Mean	   Median	   Mean	  Log	  
Imagery	  Control	   0.0211	   0.0131	   -­‐4.252	  
Past	   0.0209	   0.0124	   -­‐4.362	  
Future	   0.0221	   0.0132	   -­‐4.277	  
Table	  1.	  Descriptive	  statistics	  for	  k	  across	  conditions.	  Given	  the	  skewness	  of	  k,	  median	  and	  mean	  of	  the	  log	  of	  k	  are	  reported.	  
	  
Episodic	  construction	  and	  elaboration	  phase	  Reaction	  times	  (RTs)	  indicating	  that	  subjects	  found	  a	  target	  for	  imagery	  differed	  between	  the	  episodic	  conditions	  and	  the	  imagery	  control	  (t32	  =	  11.47).	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  two	  episodic	  thought	  conditions	  were	  matched	  but	  the	  imagery	  control	  may	  have	  been	  more	  difficult	  or	  time	  consuming.	  	  Phenomenological	  ratings	  support	  that	  the	  imagery	  task	  was	  performed	  as	  intended,	  as	  ratings	  of	  visual	  imagery	  intensity,	  emotionality	  and	  self-­‐relevance	  for	  the	  episodic	  conditions	  were	  greater	  than	  for	  the	  imagery	  control	  condition	  (t32=8.06,	  t32=4.30,	  t32=8.50,	  Table	  2).	  This	  supports	  that	  the	  task	  was	  completed	  as	  intended,	  since	  episodic	  thought	  would	  be	  predicted	  to	  be	  more	  emotional,	  self-­‐relevant	  and	  visually	  vivid	  than	  abstract	  visual	  imagery.	  However,	  imagery	  intensity	  was	  also	  greater	  for	  past	  compared	  to	  future	  (t25=4.68),	  suggesting	  the	  two	  episodic	  conditions	  may	  not	  be	  completely	  balanced	  in	  regards	  to	  imagery	  intensity.	  Finally,	  no	  differences	  were	  found	  between	  past	  and	  the	  imagery	  control	  in	  temporal	  distance	  from	  the	  present,	  emotionality	  and	  self-­‐relevance	  supporting	  that	  the	  two	  episodic	  conditions	  were	  mostly	  well	  balanced	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Condition	   Intensity	   Emotionality	   Self-­‐Relevance	   Time	   RT	  (msec)	  
Imagery	  Control	   3.15	   1.77	   1.70	   NA	   3093	  
Past	   3.74	   2.82	   2.76	   3.75	   2424	  
Future	   3.32	   2.55	   2.60	   3.79	   2408	  	  	  
Table	  2.	  Phenomenological	  ratings	  and	  reaction	  time	  for	  the	  episodic	  construction	  and	  elaboration	  phase.	  All	  phenomenological	  ratings	  were	  greater	  for	  episodic	  conditions	  compared	  to	  the	  imagery	  control	  condition.	  Differences	  between	  the	  episodic	  conditions	  were	  only	  found	  for	  intensity	  ratings.	  
	  
Relationship	  between	  phenomenological	  ratings	  and	  choice	  behavior	  In	  order	  to	  investigate	  the	  question	  of	  what	  attributes	  of	  mental	  imagery	  might	  influence	  temporal	  discounting,	  we	  regressed	  the	  phenomenological	  ratings	  for	  each	  trial	  on	  the	  reward	  choice	  made.	  None	  of	  the	  phenomenological	  ratings	  significantly	  predicted	  intertemporal	  choice.	  These	  findings	  are	  surprising	  because	  prior	  studies	  have	  found	  imagery	  intensity	  to	  correlate	  with	  choice	  behavior.	  Furthermore,	  an	  interaction	  between	  emotionality	  and	  episodic	  condition	  (future	  vs	  past)	  approached	  significance	  (p=0.06),	  such	  that	  emotionality	  was	  more	  related	  to	  later	  choices	  for	  past	  compared	  to	  future.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  past	  thought	  condition	  was	  a	  novel	  feature	  of	  this	  study	  may	  explain	  why	  this	  relationship	  has	  not	  been	  previously	  found.	  In	  addition,	  there	  was	  a	  near	  significant	  interaction	  between	  self-­‐relevance	  and	  episodic	  condition,	  such	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  self-­‐relevance	  and	  later	  choices	  is	  greater	  for	  future	  compared	  to	  past	  (p=.06).	  This	  finding	  is	  of	  interest	  because,	  again,	  previous	  studies	  have	  found	  imagery	  intensity	  to	  be	  the	  most	  predictive	  of	  intertemporal	  choice,	  not	  self-­‐relevance.	  These	  differences	  also	  hint	  at	  how	  these	  episodic	  processes	  may	  differ	  in	  their	  interaction	  with	  decision-­‐making.	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In	  an	  attempt	  to	  replicate	  the	  existing	  finding	  that	  imagery	  predicts	  discounting,	  we	  conducted	  a	  more	  liberal	  analysis	  that	  excluded	  subject	  as	  a	  random	  effect.	  With	  this	  approach,	  intensity	  is	  the	  most	  predictive	  of	  choice	  (z=3.18,	  p<.001)	  such	  that	  more	  vividly	  intense	  imagery	  predicts	  later	  choices.	  These	  findings	  are	  in	  concordance	  with	  the	  existing	  literature	  and	  suggest	  that	  this	  effect	  is	  only	  found	  when	  within-­‐subject	  correlations	  are	  not	  appropriately	  modeled.	  In	  order	  to	  confirm	  this	  conclusion,	  we	  regressed	  the	  average	  ratings	  for	  each	  condition,	  for	  each	  subject,	  on	  the	  discounting	  parameter	  k.	  This	  group-­‐level	  analysis	  also	  found	  that	  imagery	  predicts	  discounting.	  This	  suggests	  that	  imagery	  intensity	  can	  predict	  discounting	  across	  subjects,	  but	  not	  within	  subjects.	  In	  other	  words,	  there	  are	  individual	  differences	  between	  subjects	  such	  that	  those	  that	  rate	  their	  imagery	  as	  higher	  discount	  less,	  but	  within	  subjects,	  trials	  that	  are	  rated	  more	  highly	  on	  imagery	  are	  not	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  later	  choices.	  	  
Discussion	  	   	  
	   The	  results	  of	  the	  present	  experiment	  provide	  evidence	  for	  an	  effect	  of	  episodic	  past	  thought	  on	  subsequent	  intertemporal	  choice	  such	  that	  thinking	  about	  the	  past	  prior	  to	  making	  intertemporal	  choices	  reduces	  temporal	  discounting	  (TD).	  Moreover,	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  episodic	  memory	  on	  temporal	  discounting	  is	  greater	  than	  the	  effect	  of	  episodic	  future	  thought	  on	  TD.	  However,	  we	  did	  not	  find	  evidence	  that	  episodic	  future	  thought	  reduces	  TD.	  
Episodic	  Memory	  and	  Temporal	  Discounting	  	   As	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  difference	  in	  temporal	  discounting	  between	  the	  imagery	  control	  condition	  and	  the	  past	  thought	  condition,	  thinking	  about	  past	  episodic	  events	  prior	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to	  making	  an	  intertemporal	  choice	  reduces	  temporal	  discounting.	  This	  finding	  is	  very	  interesting	  in	  particular	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  previously	  established	  finding	  that	  episodic	  future	  though	  reduces	  TD.	  In	  some	  ways,	  this	  finding	  shouldn’t	  be	  surprising	  given	  that	  episodic	  past	  and	  future	  thought	  share	  many	  common	  processes	  such	  as	  constructivism,	  visual	  imagery,	  a	  removal	  from	  the	  present	  moment,	  and	  a	  temporal	  component.	  Thus,	  it	  is	  quite	  likely	  that	  a	  common	  episodic	  process	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  reduction	  of	  temporal	  discounting.	  The	  present	  findings	  suggest	  that	  further	  research	  should	  be	  devoted	  to	  disentangling	  the	  commonalities	  and	  differences	  of	  future	  and	  past	  thought	  and	  how	  they	  influence	  temporal	  discounting.	  	  	   Moreover,	  the	  current	  literature	  on	  state	  modulation	  of	  temporal	  discounting	  has	  largely	  focused	  on	  the	  aforementioned	  effect	  of	  future	  thought	  on	  TD.	  However,	  the	  present	  findings	  suggest	  that	  further	  research	  needs	  to	  be	  conducted	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  episodic	  memory	  on	  temporal	  discounting..	  Such	  a	  relationship	  would	  be	  consistent	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  thinking	  about	  the	  past	  involves	  reflecting	  on	  past	  consequences	  and	  may	  inform	  present	  decision-­‐making.	  Moreover,	  thinking	  about	  the	  past	  may	  allow	  you	  to	  escape	  the	  present	  moment	  more	  vividly	  than	  thinking	  about	  the	  future.	  The	  finding	  that	  participants	  rated	  imagery	  intensity	  as	  higher	  in	  the	  past	  compared	  to	  future	  supports	  this	  possibility.	  The	  magnitude	  of	  these	  effects	  should	  be	  further	  studied	  in	  order	  to	  make	  further	  conclusions.	  
Episodic	  Future	  Thought	  and	  the	  Imagery	  Control	  The	  present	  experiment	  failed	  to	  find	  a	  significant	  difference	  between	  the	  imagery	  control	  and	  the	  episodic	  future	  thought	  condition.	  There	  are	  a	  few	  interpretations	  of	  these	  results.	  First,	  it	  could	  be	  that	  the	  control	  was	  not	  sufficiently	  neutral	  and	  either	  through	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similar	  or	  different	  mechanisms	  also	  reduced	  TD.	  There	  is	  some	  evidence	  that	  this	  may	  be	  the	  case	  because	  the	  reaction	  time	  was	  greater	  for	  this	  condition	  than	  the	  episodic	  conditions.	  It	  may	  be	  that	  the	  increased	  effort	  or	  time	  on	  task	  spent	  creating	  targets	  of	  imagery	  reduced	  TD	  in	  the	  control	  and	  masked	  any	  additional	  decrease	  by	  episodic	  future	  thought	  when	  using	  this	  imagery	  control	  as	  the	  baseline.	  If	  this	  is	  true,	  matching	  the	  time	  on	  task	  for	  all	  three	  conditions	  should	  reveal	  an	  effect	  of	  future	  thought	  on	  TD.	  Another	  possibility	  is	  that	  the	  imagery	  control	  reduced	  TD	  through	  imagery	  mechanisms	  common	  to	  the	  other	  two	  conditions.	  This	  cannot	  be	  ruled	  out,	  as	  previous	  experiments	  have	  not	  used	  an	  imagery	  control	  such	  as	  this.	  In	  particular,	  Benoit	  et	  al	  (2011)	  used	  an	  “estimate”	  control	  that	  did	  not	  have	  an	  imagery	  component	  and	  Peters	  and	  Buchel	  (2011)	  simply	  used	  standard	  intertemporal	  choice	  trials	  as	  their	  baseline.	  In	  order	  to	  resolve	  these	  issues,	  future	  work	  should	  compare	  different	  control	  conditions	  versus	  the	  episodic	  conditions.	  It	  would	  be	  useful	  to	  also	  compare	  a	  non-­‐imagery	  control	  with	  imagery	  controls	  to	  investigate	  the	  role	  of	  pure	  imagery	  in	  reducing	  TD.	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  other	  changes	  in	  the	  paradigm	  led	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  an	  effect	  of	  episodic	  future	  thought	  on	  TD.	  In	  particular,	  the	  present	  experiment	  	  relied	  on	  priming	  from	  the	  episodic	  construction	  and	  imagery	  phase	  to	  be	  strong	  enough	  to	  affect	  decision-­‐making	  trials	  .	  This	  is	  opposed	  to	  Peters	  and	  Buchel	  (2011),	  where	  a	  cue	  word	  representing	  a	  future	  event	  was	  displayed	  on	  the	  screen	  during	  the	  decision-­‐making	  trial.	  One	  possibility	  for	  future	  research	  is	  to	  adapt	  the	  Peters	  and	  Buchel	  paradigm	  with	  an	  added	  past	  condition	  and	  compare	  their	  effects	  on	  TD.	  If	  past	  also	  reduced	  TD	  in	  that	  experiment,	  it	  would	  suggest	  that	  the	  present	  methodology	  was	  simply	  less	  effective,	  but	  the	  fundamental	  mechanisms	  are	  similar.	  If	  the	  pattern	  of	  results	  were	  different,	  it	  would	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suggest	  that	  the	  two	  methodologies	  are	  fundamentally	  different	  in	  the	  mechanism	  by	  which	  they	  influence	  decision-­‐making.	  
Episodic	  Future	  Thought	  &	  Intertemporal	  Choice	  Mechanisms	  A	  goal	  of	  the	  present	  experiment	  was	  to	  test	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  reduction	  in	  TD	  by	  episodic	  future	  thought	  was	  due	  a	  general	  “temporal	  orientation”.	  A	  current	  view	  in	  the	  literature	  is	  that	  the	  mechanism	  by	  which	  TD	  is	  reduced	  is	  that	  a	  specific	  value	  representation	  is	  activated	  by	  future	  thought	  and	  transferred	  from	  memory	  systems	  to	  valuation	  systems.	  In	  the	  present	  experiment,	  participants	  engaged	  in	  future	  thought	  unrelated	  to	  specific	  later	  choice	  present;	  thus	  if	  future	  thought	  reduced	  TD,	  it	  would	  suggest	  that	  this	  is	  accomplished	  by	  a	  general	  “time	  orientation”	  not	  a	  specific	  value	  representation.	  	  An	  additional	  interpretation	  of	  the	  present	  result	  that	  episodic	  future	  thought	  did	  not	  reduce	  TD	  is	  that	  the	  mechanisms	  underlying	  previously	  found	  reduction	  of	  TD	  by	  future	  thought	  are	  indeed	  dependent	  on	  a	  specific	  value	  representation.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  present	  methodology	  in	  which	  participants	  imagined	  a	  future	  event	  unrelated	  to	  the	  delayed	  reward	  did	  not	  reduce	  their	  TD	  because	  their	  imagery	  did	  not	  activate	  the	  
specific	  value	  representation	  related	  to	  the	  delayed	  option.	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  it	  would	  be	  very	  interesting	  because	  despite	  the	  similarities	  between	  episodic	  past	  and	  future	  thought,	  it	  seems	  that	  past	  thought	  does	  not	  require	  a	  specific	  value	  representation	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  TD	  while	  future	  thought	  does.	  Further	  research	  should	  explore	  this	  issue.	  Presently	  we	  are	  limited	  because	  subjects	  rated	  past	  imagery	  and	  emotionality	  as	  being	  greater.	  Thus	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  those	  differences	  led	  to	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  episodic	  conditions.	  Future	  studies	  should	  attempt	  to	  both	  increase	  their	  power	  to	  find	  differences	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by	  strengthening	  their	  episodic	  thought	  manipulations	  and	  further	  matching	  the	  two	  conditions.	  
Awareness	  Finally,	  another	  concern	  regarding	  the	  present	  experiment	  is	  that	  the	  methodology	  may	  have	  been	  too	  transparent,	  and	  subjects	  modified	  their	  responses	  when	  they	  became	  aware	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  experiment.	  This	  is	  suggested	  by	  the	  finding	  that	  56%	  of	  participants	  reported	  being	  aware	  of	  the	  intent	  of	  the	  manipulation.	  Unfortunately,	  we	  do	  not	  have	  sufficient	  subjects	  to	  investigate	  differences	  between	  aware	  and	  unaware	  subjects	  but	  this	  may	  suggest	  that	  a	  different	  paradigm	  may	  better	  mask	  the	  intent	  of	  the	  priming	  from	  subjects.	  Moreover,	  the	  priming	  effects	  may	  have	  a	  longer	  duration	  and	  may	  require	  longer	  blocks	  of	  episodic	  thought	  in	  order	  to	  have	  a	  larger	  effect	  on	  decision-­‐making.	  	  A	  follow-­‐up	  study	  to	  resolve	  these	  issues	  could	  be	  done	  by	  modifying	  the	  experiment	  to	  be	  a	  between-­‐subjects	  design.	  In	  particular,	  if	  participants	  performed	  a	  20	  minute	  imagery	  session	  followed	  by	  a	  block	  of	  decision-­‐making	  trials,	  it	  would	  obscure	  the	  manipulation	  and	  ensure	  strong	  priming.	  
Relationship	  between	  imagery	  intensity	  and	  discounting	  Prior	  studies	  in	  the	  literature	  have	  found	  that	  imagery	  intensity	  is	  a	  key	  attribute	  of	  episodic	  thought	  that	  reduces	  temporal	  discounting	  (Peters	  &	  Büchel,	  2010).	  However,	  by	  emplying	  mixed	  effects	  models	  that	  require	  within-­‐subject	  correlations,	  we	  found	  that	  intensity	  does	  not	  predict	  later	  choices	  at	  the	  subject	  level.	  However,	  at	  the	  group	  level,	  imagery	  intensity	  is	  predictive	  of	  overall	  discounting	  at	  between	  subjects.	  These	  findings	  are	  important	  for	  theories	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  these	  processes.	  In	  particular,	  it	  suggests	  that	  imagery	  capacities	  are	  likely	  to	  differ	  across	  subjects,	  such	  that	  those	  that	  can	  better	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imagine	  the	  future	  or	  past	  show	  overall	  lower	  levels	  of	  discounting.	  However,	  this	  is	  more	  akin	  to	  a	  trait	  difference	  than	  a	  state-­‐difference.	  In	  other	  words,	  a	  more	  intense	  imagery	  episode	  is	  not	  more	  likely	  to	  reduce	  TD	  transiently.	  	  In	  the	  current	  literature,	  such	  differentiations	  have	  not	  been	  clearly	  made	  and	  the	  present	  results	  suggest	  that	  future	  studies	  should	  be	  more	  careful	  about	  within	  versus	  between	  subjects	  predictors	  of	  temporal	  discounting.	  	  In	  conclusion,	  the	  present	  experiment	  suggests	  that	  episodic	  past	  thought	  may	  have	  a	  greater	  effect	  in	  reduction	  of	  temporal	  discounting	  than	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  current	  literature,	  episodic	  future	  thought.	  However,	  the	  present	  study	  also	  highlights	  some	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  processes	  and	  opens	  some	  questions	  about	  how	  their	  mechanisms	  may	  differ.	  In	  particular,	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  a	  specific	  value	  representation	  is	  required	  for	  future	  but	  not	  past	  episodic	  thought	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  TD	  needs	  to	  be	  further	  investigated.	  Episodic	  thought	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  remove	  us	  from	  the	  here	  and	  now,	  allowing	  us	  to	  reflect	  on	  our	  actions	  and	  decisions,	  and	  it	  may	  be	  these	  processes	  that	  can	  reduce	  temporal	  discounting.	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